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Despatches from the Front: Recent
Skirmishes Along the Frontiers of Electronic
Contracting Law
By Jane Kaufman Winn and Michael Rhoades Pullen*

INTRODUCTION

In 1999, the volume of business conducted over the Internet
computer networks continued to accelerate rapidly, while the
hype associated with electronic commerce accelerated at an

astonishing pace. The amount of attention focused on "e-bu

business managers, lawmakers, and the mass media reached un

heights, exacerbating a wide range of controversies regard

changes, if any, need to be made in existing commercial laws
modate these innovations. Many of these issues have been d
years, or even decades, among lawyers and managers confront
generations of electronic commerce technologies. The migrati
paper and computerized business processes to new technologie
the Internet, however, makes these debates suddenly seem very
very urgent.1 Controversies surrounding law reforms to acco
new generation of "e-business" have unfolded within state leg
the United States,2 the uniform law drafting projects sponsor

*Ms. Winn is an Associate Professor at Southern Methodist University Sch

member of the New York Bar, and co-author of The Law of Electronic Comme
her recent publications on the law of electronic commerce are available from
at <http://www.smu.edu/~jwinn>. Mr. Pullen is an associate with Dibb, Lupto
in the firm's Brussels, Belgium office, where he specializes in the law of the E
(EU) and electronic commerce developments. The authors would like to thank
Timothy Davis, John Gregory, Ian Grigg, Peter Weiss, Michael White, and W
ward for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.

1 . For an overview of how earlier generations of electronic commerce technologies and
commercial law reform efforts differ from the current controversies surrounding Internet
commerce, see Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet Com-

merce, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1 177 (1998). For a more detailed discussion of many legal issues that
first emerged in the discussion of electronic contracting in the 1 980s that remain relevant to

Internet electronic contracting, see generally Benjamin Wright & Jane K. Winn, The

Law of Electronic Commerce (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 1999).

2. For an annotated summary of state and federal legislation, as well as legislation outside
the United States on electronic commerce and digital signature issues, see McBride Baker &
455

This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Mon, 08 Jan 2018 18:37:05 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

456 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 55, November 1999
National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws

(NCCUSL),3 the U.S. Congress,4 the United Nations Commission on
ternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL),5 the EU,6 and many other nat
legislatures around the world.7

Coles, Summary of Electronic Commerce and Distal Signature L·gL·lation (visited Aug.
<http://wvvw.mbc.com/ecommerce.html>. For a general description of public key c

raphy and digital signatures, see, e.g., WARWICK FORD & MICHAEL S. Baum,
Electronic Commerce (1997); Simson Garfinkel with Gene Spafford, Web Security and Commerce 187-208 (1998); Wright & Winn, supra note 1, § 3.06[D].
Legislation dealing with digital signatures often refers to certain roles played by parties
using public key cryptography in different capacities. Public key cryptography uses two different, but inextricably related, encryption "keys" to encrypt and decrypt messages. An individual using a "private" key to digitally sign documents will normally ask a trusted third

party to issue a certificate so that other individuals will have confidence that the digital
signature accurately identifies that individual. The individual seeking a certificate will turn
over the public key, retaining exclusive control at all times of the private key. The third party
issuing the certificate that identifies the individual and contains a copy of that person's public

key is often called a "certification authority" (CA). The signing party is often called a "subscriber" because he or she has subscribed to the CA's certification service by submitting
identification information and a copy of his or her public key. A party who asks to see a
digital signature certificate issued by a third party before relying on a digital signature is often

called a "relying party." The environment within which individuals can rely on each other's
digital signatures because of the trust created by the issuance of certificates by CAs is often

called a "public key infrastructure" (PKI). See generally RSA's crypto FAQ <http://
www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/faq> (providing information on public key cryptography).
3. Information about uniform law drafting projects addressing electronic commerce issues

is available on NCCUSL's World Wide Web (web) site at <http://www.nccusl.org>. The
texts of current and prior drafts of the Uniform Law Commissioners' (ULC) are available
on a web site maintained by the University of Pennsylvania. See Drafts of Uniform and

Model Acts Official Site (visited Sept. 5, 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
ulc.htm>. The electronic contracting provisions of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act

(UETA) and the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) are discussed
infra notes 10-132.

4. In August 1999, the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act,
H.R. 1714, 106th Cong. (1999), and the Third Millennium Electronic Commerce Act, S.
761, 106th Cong. (1999) were pending in Congress. These bills are discussed infra notes
133-48.

5. In 1995, the UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce (WG-EC) completed a model law on electronic commerce and is currently preparing a model law on
electronic signatures. Information about the deliberations of the WG-EC are available on
the UNCITRAL web site. See Recent Documents of UNCITRAL and its Working Groups:
Working Group on Electronic Commerce (visited Aug. 22, 1999) <http://www.uncitral.org/

english/sessions/wg_ec/index.htm>. The work of the WG-EC is discussed infra notes
225-30.

6. Information about legal aspects of the electronic commerce initiatives of the Commission of the EU is available from its web site. See Electronic Commerce and the European
Union (visited Aug. 22, 1999) <http://www.ispo.cec.be/ecommerce/legal/legal.html>. Proposed directives on electronic commerce and electronic signatures as well as proposed regulations governing jurisdiction over online consumer transactions are discussed infra notes
149-206.

7. See McBride Baker & Coles, supra note 2 (discussing developments in other countries).
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This Article will provide a short overview of the current efforts in the

United States and the EU to reform contract law to accommodate recent

innovations in electronic contracting.8 Whether changes are needed to
current contract law doctrines governing contract formation, effectiveness
of contract terms, choice of law and forum provisions, special protections
for consumers, and signature and writing requirements, revisions in these
areas have all proved controversial. Even in those areas where a consensus
may be emerging on whether law reform may be appropriate in some
form, consensus is often still lacking with regard to the specific legislation
needed to accomplish those reforms. The United States is not the only
major arena where such reforms are being debated. The EU is addressing

the same problems, but taking a markedly different approach. If the
United States and EU commit themselves to divergent approaches to the

regulation of electronic contracting, major obstacles will be placed
in the paths of businesses hoping to exploit global electronic markets.
Businesses may then be forced to design their electronic commerce systems
to conform to multiple, incompatible legal standards, or face the prospect
of being shut out of major markets for electronic commerce services
altogether.9

UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION INITIATIVES

In 1988, the Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) of the Unifor
mercial Code (U.C.C.) appointed a study committee to determine

revisions were needed to Article 2 of the U.C.C. In 1991, the

the American Law Institute (ALI) appointed a drafting committee
revising U.C.C. Article 2, acting on the recommendations of the
tee.10 In addition to other objectives, these revisions were supp

8. See Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Commerce and the Symbiotic Relationship Between In

and Domestic Law Reform, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1931 (1998) [hereinafter Boss, Electronic

Amelia H. Boss, Searching for Secunty in the Law of Electronic Commerce, 23 No VA

(1999); Jeff C. Dodd &James A. Hernandez, Contracting in Cyberspace, 3 COMPU
& Tech. J. 1 (1998); Raymond T. Nimmer, Electronic Contracting: Ugal Issues, 14J. M

J. Computer & Info. L. 21 1 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor Memorandum
International Electronic Commerce Projects, 4 Electronic Com. & L. Rep. (BNA

26, 1999). The use of electronic commerce regulatory standards as a form of non-ta

barrier has been widely debated in the context of the EU Directive on the Pr
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Mov
Such Data and the determination by the EU that U.S. law does not currently pr
quate privacy safeguards to permit free transfers of data from the EU to the U

See P. Amy Monahan, Deconstructing Information Walk: The Impact of the European Dat

on U.S. Businesses, 29 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 275, 287 (1998); Directive on the
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free M

of Such Data, Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 OJ. (L 281) 31, available i
wwweuropa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/dataprot/news/925.htm>.

1 0. See PEB Study Group, PEB Study Group Report: Uniform Commercial Code, Article

Summary, 46 Bus. Law. 1869 (1991).
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remove impediments to electronic com
the current text of the Statute of Fraud
preted as requiring the use of paper to
revision process originally included soft
failure of the "hub and spokes" approac
licensing was removed from it and a se
committee was formed. A separate draft
to make any changes needed to keep U.
leasing transactions, compatible with t
posed Article 2B.
The revision of Article 2 and the draf
controversial in some areas affecting el
countered substantial criticism from: (i)

draft was too accommodating to the softw

industries" who believed that the scope
who sought to have their industries excl

those who felt that Article 2B would disturb the current boundaries be-

tween state contract law governing licensing and federal law governing
intellectual property rights in undesirable ways.13 Throughout 1998 and
1999, the Article 2B drafting committee made efforts to respond to the
concerns of these and other groups with revisions to its text. In April 1999,

when it became clear that Article 2B might not garner the support it
needed to gain the approval of the ALI,14 the ULC announced its intention to change Article 2B into a freestanding uniform law outside the
11. See, e.g., Letter from Steve Brobeck, Consumer Federation of America, Todd Paglia,
Consumer Project on Technology, Linda Golodner, National Consumers League, Edmund
Mierzwinski, U.S. Public Interest Group, to Charles Allen Wright, President of ALI, and
Gene Lebrun, President of NCCUSL (Nov. 10, 1998), in <http://www.cptech.org/ucc/
sign-on. html>.
12. See, e.g., Letter from Vans Stevenson, Senior Vice President, Motion Picture Associa-

tion of America, to Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Chair, U.C.C. 2B Drafting Committee (Nov. 9,
1998), in <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/mpaall98.html> [hereinafter MPAA Letter].
The copyright industries include the film, television, radio, music, and publishing industries.

13. See, e.g., Amendment to Article 2B Uniform Commercial Code, Proposed by Harvey

Perlman, Nebraska Commissioner on Uniform State Laws (visited Oct. 10, 1999), in
<http://www.2bguide.com/docs/2B-amend.html>. This proposal was approved by the
ULC at its annual meeting: in luly 1998.

14. In order for U.C.C. Article 2B to become part of the official text of the U.C.C, it
requires the approval of both the ALI and the ULC at their respective annual meetings. At
its December Executive Council Meeting, the ALI removed consideration of U.C.C. Article
2B from the agenda for its May 1999 annual meeting. Even if the ULC had approved U.C.C.
Article 2B at its annual meeting in July 1999, U.C.C. Article 2B could not have been finalized

before the ALI annual meeting in May 2000. In May 1999, the three ALI members of the
drafting committee, David Bartlett, Amy Boss, and David Rice, declined to continue their
participation in the drafting committee due to concerns over UCITA's suitability for enactment in its current form. See Memorandum from David Bartlett, Amy Boss, and David Rice,

to the UCITA Drafting Committee (May 7, 1999), in <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/
50799dad.html>.
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U.C.C., the UCITA.15 At its annual meeting in July 1999, the ULC finalized UCITA over opposition from consumer groups,16 the entertainment and publishing industries,17 and some participants in the software
industry.18
Revised Article 2 encountered substantial criticism from trade and in-

dustry groups, who were concerned with the increase in the uncertainty
of business transactions,19 the lack of adequate justification for its changes
to current law,20 and the notion that the proposal tipped the current bal-

ance between merchant and consumer interests in favor of consumers.21

Throughout 1998 and 1999, the Article 2 drafting committee made efforts
to respond to criticism from trade and industry groups with revisions to
the text of revised Article 2. Following changes addressing these concerns,
revised Article 2 was approved by the ALI at its annual meeting in May
1999, and like UCITA, was considered by the ULC at its annual meeting
in July 1999. Although revised U.C.C. Article 2 enjoyed the support of
consumer groups, it was still the subject of considerable criticism from a
wide range of industry and trade groups. In the face of this concerted
opposition, the text of revised Article 2 was withdrawn from consideration
before it was put to a vote at the ULC annual meeting due to concerns

that it would not achieve uniform enactment if it became final in its then

current form. In August 1999, the ULC and the ALI announced that a
new drafting committee had been formed to revise both U.C.C. Articles
2 and 2A.22 It was unclear when this new drafting committee was expected
to complete its assignment.
A drafting committee was also appointed by the ULC in 1996 to begin
work on a uniform law aimed at supplementing the U.C.C. in removing
15. See NCCUSL Press Release, NCCUSL to Promulgate Freestanding Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, ALI and NCCUSL Announce that Legal Rules for
Computer Information Will Not Be Part of U.C.C. (visited Oct. 10, 1999), in <http://
www.nccusl.org/pressrel/2brel.html>.
16. See, e.g., Letter from Gail Hillebrand, Consumers Union, to NCCUSL (June 21,1 999),
in <http://www.2beuide.com/docs/cu699.html>.

17. See, e.g., MPAA Letter, supra note 12.

18. See, e.g., Letter from Barbara Simons, President of Association for Computing Machinery, to NCCUSL (July 12, 1999), in <http://www.acm.org/usacm/copyright/usacmucita.html>. The Association for Computing Machinery is one of the oldest and largest
associations for computing professionals in the world.
19. See, e.g., Motion from William A. Worthington, to ALI (May 14, 1999), in <http://
www.ali.orff/ali/ 1 999_worthineton.htm>.
20. See, e.g., Motion from James J. White, to ALI (May 13, 1999), in <http://www.ali.org/
ali/1999_Whitel.htm>.

21. See, e.g., Memorandum from the National Association of Manufacturers et al., to the
U.C.C. Article 2 Drafting Committee (Jan. 29, 1999) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law).

22. See NCCUSL Press Release, ALI and NCCUSL Announce New Drafting Committee
for U.C.C. Articles 2 and 2A (visited Oct. 10, 1999), in <http://www.nccusl.org/pressrel/
ucc2a2.htm>.
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obstacles to electronic commerce in state laws.23 In light of the volume of
state laws enacted to address electronic commerce issues and the clear

need for greater uniformity in state law in this area, this project was placed

on a "fast track" by the ULC. Drafting began in 1997 and was completed
in 1999, and the UETA was approved by the ULC at its annual meeting
in July 1999.24 Following the 1999 ULC annual meeting, both the UETA
and UCITA were in final form and available for consideration by state
legislatures, while revisions to U.C.C. Articles 2 and 2 A (as well as revisions
to U.C.C. Article 1) were still in the process of being drafted.
UETA25

When work began on the UETA in 1996, the drafting committee re-

viewed various legislative models including the UNCITRAL Model Law
on Electronic Commerce, the then current draft of proposed U.C.C. Article 2B, and various draft laws under consideration in different states. The

scope of the project quickly became one of the most controversial issues
the drafting committee would have to resolve.26 A consensus eventually
emerged that the UETA should be "procedural" in nature, merely creating an "overlay" of existing law that would keep changes in the under-

lying substantive law to an absolute minimum. This approach is very

similar to that taken by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce.27 In order to aid individual state legislatures in the process of reviewing their existing laws for obstacles to electronic commerce, such as
paper writing and manual signature requirements, the drafting committee
developed a list of various existing state laws that might be excluded from
the scope of the UETA.28
23. See Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (Draft for Approval, July 23-30,

1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/uecicta/etaam99.htm> [hereinafter UETA
Draft].
24. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (Official Text Approved at NCCUSL Annual

Conference, July 23-30, 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/
ueta.htm> [hereinafter UETA]. The UETA text is in its final version, but the UETA's
Reporters are to submit the final Prefatory notes and comments at a later date. Thus, any
citation to the UETA's Prefatory notes and comments will be to the Draft for Approval, July
23-30, 1999. See supra note 23.
25. Information about the UETA can be obtained from Carol A. Kunze, A Forum for the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (visited Oct. 7, 1999) <http://www.webcom.com/legaled/
ETAForum>.

26. UETA Draft, supra note 23, prefatory n.l.
27. See Boss, Electronic Commerce, supra note 8, at 1963-68; A. Brooke Overby, UNCITR
Model Law on Electronic Commerce: Will Cyberlaw Be Uniform?, 7 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L.
224 (1999); see also infra text accompanying notes 207-24 (discussing the UNCITRAL Mo

Law on Electronic Commerce).
28. UETA Draft, supra note 23, § 103(b) n.2. The drafting committee was assisted in i
consideration of scope issues by the NCCUSL. NCCUSL, Uniform Electronic Transact

Act, Task Force on State Law Exclusions Report (Sept. 21, 1998), in <http://ww

webcom.com/legaled/ETAForum/docs/report4.html>.
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While early drafts of the UETA included provisions dealing with contract formation using electronic media and presumptions associating legal
consequences with the use of more secure authentication technologies for
signature functions, these provisions were later removed as inconsistent
with the "procedural" orientation of the statute.29 The drafting committee
also considered, and then rejected, suggestions that heightened legal protections should be given to electronic records and signatures, which have
been created and "used in conformity with security procedures which
demonstrate greater reliability."30
The removal of these provisions was quite controversial, as some observers at the drafting committee meetings felt very strongly that an elec-

tronic commerce enabling statute should address such questions regarding
the rights and responsibilities of certificate authorities and parties relying
on digital signature certificates.31 A common feature of technology-specific

legislation is a provision that associates particular legal outcomes with the
use of particular technologies, either through the use of evidentiary presumptions or through liability rules.32 The UETA avoids the use of either
by providing that an electronic record or signature is attributable to a
person only if it was in fact the act of that person.33 The act of the person

may be proven in any manner, including the showing of the efficacy of a
security procedure used, but the party with the burden of proof enjoys no
evidentiary presumption to facilitate the proof The context and surrounding circumstances of the creation, execution, and adoption of an electronic
record or signature should be taken into account in determining its effect.
The UETA did follow recent U.C.C. revisions in using the term "record" as a media-neutral alternative to the term "writing."34 Unlike the
29. One example of this general observation is § 1 1 3 of the UETA Draft, which would
have validated contracts formed by the interaction of electronic agents. UETA Draft, supra
note 23, § 113.
30. Id. orefatorv n. 1 .

31. See supra note 2 (explanating certificate authorities, relying parties, and digital signature
certificates).

32. One of the first detailed statements of the technology-specific approach is contained

in the ABA Digital Signature Guidelines, published in 1996. Information Security Committee, ABA Section of Science and Technology, Digital Signature Guidelines
(1996), available in <http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/dsgfree.html>. For an overview
of arguments supporting a more technology-specific approach, see Thomas J. Smedinghoff
& Ruth Hill Bro, Moving With Change: Electronic Signature L·gislation as a Vehicle for Advancing E-

Commerce, 17 J. Marshall Computer & INFO. L. Rev. 723 (1999). For a critique of such
provisions as unfair and economically inefficient, see Comment from Carl Ellison & Jane
Kaufman Winn, to the Federal Trade Commission on Consumer Protection in the Global

Electronic Marketplace (Mar. 26, 1999), in <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/comments/

revwin~ 1 .htm> .

33. UETA, supra note 24, § 9.
34. For example, in the 1999 revisions to U.C.C. Article 9, "record" is defined as "information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or which is stored in an electronic or other
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(69) (1999).
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recent revision of U.C.C. Article 935 and UCITA,36 however, the UETA
does not define a new term "authenticate" to take the place of the traditional term "signature." The drafting committee concluded that the current U.C.C. definition of "signature"37 and the common law definition of
signature38 are sufficiently flexible to accommodate the needs of electronic

commerce without any modifications. Furthermore, efforts to nail down
such an amorphous and multifaceted concept as "signature" in order to
update it run the risk of being overinclusive or underinclusive, thus creating a substantive change in the law. The UETA, therefore, provides only
a definition of "electronic signature,"39 not a media-neutral restatement
of the concept of "signature" in general. A determination as to whether
an electronic signature exists would be made in light of all the surrounding
circumstances.40 The definition of "electronic signature" should be sufficiently broad to cover either an Internet click-through contracting process
in which a person clicks on some element in the graphical user interface
such as an "I agree" button in order to indicate an intent to be legally
bound, or the use of a digital signature within a PKI.
The objective of the UETA is only to facilitate electronic commerce,
not to mandate the adoption of new technologies by any party.41 The

UETA applies "only to transactions between parties each of which has
agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means."42 As with an electronic signature, the context and surrounding circumstances should be
taken into account in determining whether there is an agreement to con35. For example, in the 1999 revisions to U.C.C. Article 9, "authenticate" means: "(A) to
sign; or (B) to execute or otherwise adopt a symbol, or encrypt or similarly process a record
in whole or in part, with the present intent of the authenticating person to identify the person

and adopt or accept a record." Id. § 9-102(a)(7).

36. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 102(6) (Draft Approved at
NCCUSL Annual Conference, July 23-30, 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
ulc_frame.htm> ("Authenticate means to sign, or otherwise to execute or adopt an electronic
symbol, sound, or process attached to, included in, or logically associated or linked with, a
record or term, with the intent to sign the record or a record to which it refers.") [hereinafter
UCITA]. Please note that all citations to UCITA are to the July 1999 draft unless otherwise
specified.

37. U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (1995) defines "[s]igned" to include "any symbol executed or
adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing."
38. A signature is any mark or symbol affixed to a writing to manifest the signer's intent

to adopt it as his or her own and to be bound by it. &£just Pants v. Wagner, 617 N.E.2d
246, 251 (111. App. Ct. 1993); see also Winn, supra note 1, at 1216-21 (discussing the U.S.
common law of signatures).
39. UETA, supra note 24, § 2(8) (stating that "[electronic signature" means "an electronic
sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or
adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record").

40. UETA Draft, supra note 23, § 102 n.7.
41. UETA, supra note 24, § 5(a) ("This [Act] does not require that a record or signature
be created, generated, sent, communicated, received, stored, or otherwise processed or used
by electronic means or in electronic form.").
42. Id. § 5(b).
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duct transactions electronically.43 Furthermore, even though a party may
have agreed to conduct one transaction electronically, that party may still
refuse to conduct subsequent transactions electronically, and this provision
may not be varied by agreement.44 With regard to government records,
the UETA gives state legislatures the option of permitting each agency to
determine under what circumstances electronic records will be created or

accepted, or designating a single state officer to manage the conversion of
paper to electronic processes and make such decisions.45
The heart of the UETA is contained in section 7, which provides that
"[a] record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability
solely because it is in electronic form."46 "A contract may not be denied
legal effect or enforceability solely because an electronic record was used
in its formation."47 If a law requires a writing or a signature, then an
electronic record or an electronic signature may satisfy that requirement.48

In addition, an electronic record or signature may not be excluded from

introduction into evidence in a legal proceeding merely because it is

electronic.49

The UETA provides that, subject to certain qualifications, whenever
one party is required by other state law to furnish information in writing
to another, and the parties have already agreed to conduct transactions
electronically, then that requirement may be met by sending the information in an electronic record, as long as the information in the record is
sent in a format that can be retained by the recipient.50 If other state law
requires that a record be posted, displayed, sent, or formatted in a certain
manner, however, then the UETA does not overrule those other requirements.51 This means, for example, that where a statute now requires notice
be sent by first class mail, the UETA does not affect that requirement.

43. Id. § 2(1) (denning "agreement" as "the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their
language or inferred from other circumstances and from rules, regulations, and procedures
given the effect of agreements under laws otherwise applicable to a particular transaction").
The Reporter's Notes explain that the definition does not specifically include usage of trade
because to do so might result in an unintended substantive change in other law; however,
the reference to "other circumstances" should be flexible enough to permit usage of trade
to be taken into account in an appropriate context. UETA Draft, supra note 23, § 102 n.l.
44. UETA, supra note 24, § 5(c).

45. Id. §§ 17-19.
46. Id. § 7 (a). The Reporter's Notes explain that while a contract may be unenforceable,
it may still have legal effects, such as when a purchaser of goods under a contract rendered
unenforceable by the Statute of Frauds insures the goods against loss, and may not have its
claim in the event of such loss denied by the insurer on the grounds that the contract of sale

was unenforceable against the seller. UETA Draft, supra note 23, § 106 n.l.
47. UETA, supra note 24, § 7(b).
48. Id. § 7(c), (d).
4-y. Id. § 13.

50. Id. § 8(a).
51. Id. §8(b).
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Furthermore, if information in an electronic record is intended to meet a
statutory writing requirement, it must not be sent by an information processing system that inhibits the ability to print or download the information

in the electronic record.52 This would cover such situations as a webwrap
contract interface where terms and conditions are displayed to the enduser, but the end-user has no way to print out on paper the terms and
conditions being displayed in the Internet browser application, or other-

wise save an exact copy of that which the end-user is being asked to
agree.53 The parties may not vary these requirements by agreement, except to the extent that such variation would be permitted by other law.54
Many state laws currently set forth record retention requirements that
either require, or might be interpreted as requiring, the retention of paper

documents.55 For example, it is common for state laws to require parties

in various contexts to retain copies of canceled checks for a specified

amount of time. The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston submitted to the

UETA drafting committee a 1997 report based on information collected
by all twelve Federal Reserve Banks that identified hundreds of state and
federal statutes that currently require the retention of canceled checks.56
The existence of such laws often has a very significant chilling effect on
parties wishing to convert their current paper-based record-keeping systems to electronic systems, so the UETA contains provisions designed to
facilitate substitution of electronic for paper records in satisfaction of stat-

utory record retention requirements. Provided the electronic record accurately reflects the information set forth in the record in its original form,

and remains accessible for later reference, electronic records may be retained in lieu of paper records.57 Canceled checks are expressly included
if they are required to be retained as records.58

52. Id. § 8(c).
53. Some observers and members of the drafting committee experienced this problem
and were unable to resolve it with the standard remedy in such circumstances. In order to
print a copy of what is displayed on a screen even if there is no print function available in
the application currently being used, the end-user can usually press the "Print Screen" button
on the keyboard to transfer whatever is displayed on the screen into the operating system's
"clipboard." The image in the clipboard can then be transferred to a different application
and printed out or stored to disk. Some applications have apparently been written to preclude
this form of copying from taking place.
54. UETA, supra note 24, § 8(d).
55. For a discussion of many record retention laws and the ability of parties to substitute
electronic records for paper originals in satisfaction of those requirements, see Wright &
WlNN, supra note 1 , pt. III.

56. Patricia Allouise, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, A Survey of Laws and Regulations
Relating to Cancelled Checks (1997) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland

School of Law).
57. UETA, supra note 24, § 12(a).
58. Id. § 12(e). Checks that are still performing a payment function are not covered by
this section. See id. § 16 (governing " transfer rable records").
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The UETA has some rather complex provisions governing the time and
place of sending and receiving electronic records.59 The UETA provides
that an electronic record is received, even if no one is aware of its receipt.60

An electronic record is sent when a properly addressed message leaves the
control of the sender, or enters the control of the recipient.61 Receipt then

takes place when the message is sent to the address designated by the
intended recipient, or to a system that the recipient in fact uses to receive

messages of this type.62 The UETA also provides, for conflict of laws
purposes, that electronic messages shall be deemed to be received wherever
the recipient actually conducts his principal business or resides, though this
legal fiction for conflict of laws purposes has no effect on determining
whether the message was "received" for purposes of UETA section 15.63
Even if a message is received for purposes of the UETA, that does not
establish that the content received corresponds to the content sent.64
One noteworthy departure from the general principle that the UETA
is only procedural and makes no changes in substantive law concerns the
provisions governing transferable records.65 A transferable record is an
electronic record that would otherwise be a negotiable note under U.C.C.
Article 3 or a negotiable document under U.C.C. Article 7 if written, and
that the issuer has agreed is a transferable record.66 The drafting committee was unwilling to accept a more broadly drafted provision permitting

the creation of electronic negotiable instruments generally out of deference to the concern of regulators, such as the Federal Reserve Board, that
the regulatory divide between electronic funds transfers and paper negotiable instruments must be maintained for bank regulators to be able to
guarantee the safety and soundness of the U.S. payment system.67 The
transferrable record provisions of the UETA are drafted to permit industries such as the real estate mortgage industry to undertake pilot projects
involving electronic negotiable notes, while the PEB considers whether
revisions to U.C.C. Articles 3, 4, and 4A are needed to authorize the use
59. Id. § 15.
60. Id. § 15(e).
61. Id. § 15(a). If both sender and recipient use the same online service provider, for
example, the message may not leave the control of the sender at all, so the operative event
would be when the message had reached a part of the online service provider's system that
the recipient could access, such as an email inbox. UETA Draft, supra note 23, § 1 14(e) n.2.
62. UETA, supra note 24, § 15(b).
63. Id. S 15fc), (d): UETA Draft, sutra note 23, § 1 14 n.4.

64. UETA, supra note 24, S 15(f).
65. For a more complete discussion of the issues raised by these provisions, see R. David
Whitaker, Rules Under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act for an Electronic Equivalent to a Negotiable

Promissory Note, 55 Bus. Law. 437 (1999).

66. UETA, supra note 24, § 16(a).
67. See Memorandum from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to the ETA

Drafting Committee (Feb. 1, 1999), in <http://www.webcom.com/legaled/ETAForum/
docs/frbny.pdf > .
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of electronic negotiable instruments generally. The UETA provisions governing control of transferrable records permit the creation of the functional equivalent of holder status under current law applicable to paper

instruments or documents.68

UCITA69

UCITA is a major piece of legislation covering a broad spectrum of
issues affecting licenses of software and computer information, including
the formation, interpretation, performance, and enforcement of such con-

tracts in new electronic commerce contexts. The statute contains 1 08 sec-

tions and, in its final form for approval with a prefatory note and reporter's

notes, is over 300 pages long. It is beyond the scope of this Article to do
more than suggest what are some of the major innovations in electronic
contracting law contained in this statute.70
Just as in the drafting of the UETA, the scope provisions of UCITA
were among the most controversial provisions that the drafting committee
addressed. As its name implies, it applies to "computer information transactions."71 In other words, UCITA is a contract law statute that covers
transactions in computer software, multimedia interactive products, computer data and databases, and Internet and online information.72 In addition to provisions governing the licensing of software and other com-

puter information, UCITA contains provisions governing electronic
contracting processes used to execute transactions in software and computer information. UCITA addresses these electronic contracting issues
because distribution of software and computer information in electronic
form over computer networks is an important distribution mechanism for
such products today, and is likely to become more important in the future.

If a transaction for goods that contain no embedded software is conducted
electronically, UCITA by its terms would have no application. Until revisions of U.C.C. Article 2 are complete, however, courts and others may
68. UETA, supra note 24, § 16(b), (c). The control provisions in UETA § 16 are modeled
after the provisions of revised U.C.C. Article 9 governing electronic chattel paper. For an
analysis of the concept of control of electronic chattel paper, see Jane K. Winn, Electronic
Chattel Paper Under Revised Article 9: Updating the Concept of Embodied Rights for Electronic Commerce,

75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. (forthcoming 1999).
69. The following discussion is based on UCITA, supra note 36.
70. The ULC has posted on its web site a series of papers by Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Chair
of Committee to Draft UCITA, and Raymond T. Nimmer, Reporter of Committee to Draft

UCITA, providing responses to recurring questions on UCITA. See Series of Papers on
UCITA Issues (visited Oct. 8, 1999) <http://www.nccusl.org/pressrel/UCITAQA.htm>.
71. UCITA, supra note 36, § 103(a). A "[c]omputer information transaction" is defined
as "an agreement and the performance of that agreement to create, modify, transfer, or

license computer information or informational rights in computer information." Id.
§ 102(12).
72. See UCITA § 103 n.2 (Draft Comments to UCITA, Oct. 15, 1999) <http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/citam99.htm> [hereinafter UCITA Draft Comments].
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look to UCITA for inspiration in analyzing electronic contracting issues.

It is possible that some courts might even apply by analogy UCITA's
electronic contracting provisions to transactions in goods if the transactions are executed electronically.

The application of UCITA to transactions involving both computer
information and other subject matter is somewhat complex. In addition,
the impact of UCITA may be expanded beyond the jurisdiction of any
state that enacts it.73 This provision was quite controversial in part because
of possible revisions to the general choice of law provisions contained in

U.C.C. Article I.74 Critics and proponents of UCITA alike share a perception that the "freedom of contract" principle in UCITA tends to favor
more rigorous enforcement of form contracts that would otherwise be the
case if the current version of U.C.C Article 2 or the common law of

contracts applied to a transaction.75 Opponents of UCITA were con
73. As a general rule, UCITA applies to transactions relating solely to computer infor-

mation. See UCITA § 103(a) (Draft, Oct. 15, 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc

ulc_frame.htm>. When a transaction involves subject matter other than computer infor
mation, UCITA provides two alternative tests for determining its applicability: the primar
subject matter and material purpose tests, as provided in § 103(b):

(1) If a transaction includes computer information and goods, this [Act] applies to the
computer information and informational rights in it. However, if a copy of a computer
program is contained in and sold or leased as part of other goods, this [Act] applies to
the copy and the computer program only if:

(A) the other goods are a computer or computer peripheral; or

(B) giving the buyer or lessee of the goods access to or use of the program is ordinaril
a matenal purpose of transactions in goods of the type sold or leased.

(2) In all cases not involving goods, this [Act] applies only to the computer informatio
or informational rights in it, unless the computer information and information right
are, or access to them is, the pnmary subject matter, in which case this [Act] applies to th
entire transaction.

Id. § 103(b) (emphasis added).
74. The current default choice of law rule for the U.C.C. is contained in Article 1, which
applies to any transaction within the scope of the U.C.C. if no more specific choice of law
rule contained in one of the other articles applies. This choice of law rule currently requires
that the transaction bear a reasonable relationship to the state whose law is specified by the
parties in a contract; if the parties have not made a choice, the U.C.C. applies to transactions

bearing an appropriate relationship to a state that has enacted the U.C.C. See U.C.C.
§ 1-105(1) (1995). During the U.C.C. Article 1 revision process, there has been consideration
of removing the "reasonable relation" requirement to the contractual choice of law rule in
Article 1. If Article 1 is revised to remove the "reasonable relation" requirement, and the
forum state had adopted that version of Article 1 , and had determined that the transaction
was governed by the U.C.C, the forum state court would probably apply UCITA if that
was what the parties had specified as the governing law of the contract even if the jurisdiction

that had enacted UCITA bore no reasonable relationship to the transaction. See generally
Amelia Boss, The Jurisdiction of Commercial Law: Party Autonomy in Choosing Applicable Law and

Forum under Proposed Revisions to the U.C.C, 32 Int'l Law. 1067 (1998).

75. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jean Braucher & Peter Linzer, to Members of ALI
(May 5, 1998), in <http://www.ali.org/ali/Braucher.htm>; Memorandum from Micalyn S.
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cerned that even though they might be able to block enactment of it in
many state legislatures, the growing judicial recognition of the enforceability of choice of law and choice of forum provisions in contracts combined with widespread adoption by industry of choice of law provisions
that point to jurisdictions that have enacted UCITA would give UCITA
considerable effect even in those jurisdictions where it might have been
rejected by the state legislature.76 As a result, the final draft of UCITA
contains provisions designed to assuage the concerns of such critics.77
In mixed transactions involving both computer information and goods
or some other subject matter, UCITA applies if the primary purpose of
the contract revolves around the computer information.78 If any provision
of the U.C.C. applies to a mixed transaction, then generally UCITA does
not apply to that extent.79 If a mixed transaction involves financial services,

entertainment or broadcast content, or an employment relationship, then
UCITA does not apply at all.80 This scope provision is in marked contrast
with some of its earlier iterations in proposed U.C.C. Article 2B, which

applied to "licenses of information and software contracts."81 Such a
sweeping scope provision might have brought such diverse enterprises as
the film, television, radio, music, publishing, financial services, research
and development, and data processing industries within its terms, not to
mention public libraries and professional services such as law, accounting,
and consulting where information printed on paper is circulated subject
to restrictions. The retrenchment of the scope provisions in UCITA represents a return to something approaching the original vision of proposed
U.C.C. Article 2B, which started out in large part as a statute to validate
shrink-wrap software contracts.

One provision in UCITA highlights the often indistinct and highly controversial boundary between copyright and other federal intellectual property law on the one hand, and the law of software licenses governed by
UCITA on the other.82 This provision was added as a concession to groups

Harris, Winpro, Inc., to NCCUSL (July 19, 1999), in <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/
71999mh.html>.

76. See infra notes 1 12-22 (discussing choice of law and forum provisions in UCITA).
77. Adoption of UCITA as the governing law of a contract cannot abrogate "an otherwise applicable rule [of law] that may not be varied by agreement . . . and in a mass market
transaction, does not alter" either an applicable consumer protection statute or administrative
rule, or any law requiring that information be provided in a tangible printed form. UCITA,
supra note 36, § 103(e)(l).

78. Id. § 103(b).
79. Id. § 103(c).
80. Id. S 103(d).

81. U.C.C. §2B-103(a) (Tenative Draft Nov. 1, 1997), in <http://www.law.upenn.edu/

bll/ulc/ucc2/2bnov97.htm>.

82. UCITA, supra note 36, § 105(a) ("A provision of this [Act] which is preempted by
federal law is unenforceable to the extent of the preemption.").
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who were concerned that without a formal statement that federal intellec-

tual property law will preempt state contract law with regard to any matter

within the scope of the federal law, the provisions of UCITA might be
interpreted in a manner that would erode certain intellectual property
rights such as fair use. In addition, UCITA provides that if a term of a
contract "violates a fundamental public policy," the court may limit the
enforcement of the contract as necessary to avoid any result contrary to
public policy.83 A court may, therefore, refuse to enforce, or limit as appropriate the enforcement of unconscionable contracts or terms governed

by UCITA.84

UCITA contains a provision that is virtually identical to those in the

UETA and the UN Model Law on Electronic Commerce requiring that
a record or authentication not be denied legal effect or enforceability
merely because it is electronic form.85 In keeping with the basic policy
promoting freedom of contract, UCITA provides that nothing in it can
be construed to require that a record or authentication be electronic.86
Furthermore, a contract formed through the use of an electronic agent
will be binding on the person using the agent, even if no one was aware
of or reviewed the agent's operations or the results of the operations.87
UCITA provides that in any transaction, a person may establish requirements regarding the type of the authentication or record acceptable
to it.88 This is similar to the very general enabling language used in the
proposed federal legislation currently before Congress,89 and is in marked

83. Id. § 105(b). Considerable concern was expressed during the drafting process that
strong enforcement of information licenses would effectively put public libraries out of business in the near future when content is more likely to be delivered electronically than on the
printed page. Erosion of the kind of rights in information embodied in the copyright doctrine
of fair use are an example of a public policy that might lead a court to limit the enforcement
of an information license. See, e.g., Letter from David Bender, Special Libraries Association,

Carol C. Henderson, American Library Association, Robert Oakley, American Association
of Law Libraries, Duane E. Webster, Association of Research Libraries, to Carlyle Ring,
Chair, U.C.C. 2B Drafting Committee (Oct. 8, 1998), in <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/
librlO98.html>.

84. UCITA, supra note 36, § lll(a). The parties may not disclaim their obligations of

good faith, reasonableness, diligence, or care, although they may by agreement set standard

for meeting those obligations if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable. Id.
§ 104(c)(l).
85. Id. § 107(a); UETA, supra note 24, § 7(a); see also infra notes 210-24 and accompanying
text (discussing UNCITRAL Model Law). "Record" is a technology-neutral term that encompasses both paper and electronic writings; " [authenticate" is a technology-neutral term
that encompasses both manual and electronic signatures. UCITA, supra note 36, § 102(6),
(58).

86. UCITA, supra note 36, § 107(b).
87. Id. § 107(d); see abo id. §§ 202, 206 (regarding the legal effect of using electronic agents).

88. Id. § 107(c).
89. See infra notes 133-48 and accompanying text.
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contrast with the more nuanced provisions in the UETA90 and in the draft
European Commission (EC or Commission) Directive on electronic commerce now under consideration in the EU.91 Abstract language affirming
freedom of contract as a fundamental principle may appear neutral and
even-handed on its face. When applied to transactions where one party is
substantially more sophisticated than the other, has substantially more bar-

gaining power, or in the electronic commerce context has control over the
design of the interface, however, such a general statement may operate in
fact as a license to sophisticated corporate transactors to impose inefficient
or grossly inequitable terms on less sophisticated parties through contracts
of adhesion. One way to temper the discretion of the electronic commerce
merchant in drawing up its standard form contract and designing the user
interface while preserving a meaningful exercise of freedom of contract
by the consumer would be to require certain minimum procedural safeguards for consumers. For example, any agreement by a consumer to the
use of electronic communications media or records might be denied effect
unless it is given by the consumer using the same form of electronic media
as that the consumer is agreeing to use in the future. Such procedural
requirements would minimize the likelihood that, for example, consumers
who do not have access to computers would find themselves deemed to
have accepted notices contained in records posted to Internet web sites.92

Some of the most important provisions of UCITA clarify the legal
status of new forms of electronic contracting, such as clicking on an "I
agree" icon displayed on an Internet browser. UCITA provides that authentication may be proven in any manner, including showing that a party
90. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. For example, the UETA grants parties
a non-waivable right to withdraw consent to the use of electronic media at any time, and
requires that if the parties have agreed to conduct transactions electronically, and a law
requires a person to provide, send, or deliver information in writing to another person, that
requirement is met by the use of an electronic record only if the information is in a format
that the recipient can retain. UETA, supra note 24, §§ 5(c), 8(a).

91. See infra notes 154-75 and accompanying text; see abo Commission of the European
Communities, Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council Directive Concerning the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services and

Amending Council Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC, COM(99)385 final art.3a f 1,
available in <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgl 5/en/finances/consumer/disselen.htm>
[hereinafter Proposal Concerning Distance Marketing]; Directive 97/7/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the Protection of Consumers in Respect
of Distance Contracts, 1997 OJ. (L 144) 19, art. 5, in <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/
dg24/policy/developments/dist_sell/dist01_en.html> (requiring that a supplier communicate contractual conditions in writing or in another durable medium available and accessible
to consumer) [hereinafter Distance Selling Directive] .
92. Proponents of UCITA might argue that UCITA does not require more specific procedural controls to protect consumers from such merchant overreaching because such merchant practices could be invalidated by a court under various provisions of UCITA, including
those limiting enforcement for lack of good faith, unconscionability, or violation of a fundamental public policy. UCITA, supra note 36, §§ 104(c)(l), 105(b), 1 1 l(a).
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made use of information or access that could only have been available if

it engaged in conduct or operations that authenticated the record or
term.93 This provision will validate electronic contracting practices such
as displaying screens that the end-user must click through before being
granted access to certain functions on the vendor's system or being sold
or licensed certain goods or services. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
many online vendors using such an interface would be able to establish
what content was displayed to the end-user, that the user had accessed
successively the files containing the content, and that because of the graph-

ical user interface design, unless the appropriate responses had been given
by the end-user, the granting of access or delivery of goods or services
would not have taken place. Many merchants using such contracting interfaces are apparently not preserving a separate copy of the content combined with some particular form of electronic signature for each transaction executed electronically.94
A more general provision designed to reduce uncertainty about the legal
efficacy of electronic contracting is found in the manifestation of assent
provisions.95 The term "manifest assent" is taken from section 19 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.^ In UCITA, a party manifests assent to a
record or term if the party has first had an opportunity to review its
contents, and then either authenticates the record or term, or intentionally

engages in conduct or makes statements calculated to make the other party
believe the person is manifesting assent.97 Opportunity to review means
either the term or record was made available in a manner so that a rea-

sonable person ought to have noticed it and understood its significance.98
Comment 5 to UCITA section 1 12 provides two illustrations to clarify the

93. Id. § 107(d).
94. UCITA also retains a Statute of Frauds provision for contracts requiring payment of
$5000 or more, however, which such contracting practices would not seem to meet. It requires

that "the party against which enforcement is sought authenticated a record sufficient to
indicate that a contract has been formed and which reasonably identifies the copy or subject
matter to which the contract refers." Id. § 201(a)(l).

95. Id. § 112.
96. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19 (1979). Section 19 concerning conduct as manifestation of assent provides:

(1) The manifestation of assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken
words or by other acts or by failure to act. (2) The conduct of a party is not effective
as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and knows
or has reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.
(3) The conduct of a party may manifest assent even though he does not in fact assent.
In such cases a resulting contract may be voidable because of fraud, duress, mistake, or
other invalidating cause.
Id.

97. UCITA, supra note 36, § 1 12(a).
98. Id. ξ H2(e)(i).
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meaning of this provision in the context of Internet contracting." In the
first, the registration screen prominently states: " Tlease read the License.
It contains important terms about your use and our obligations with respect to the information. If you agree to the license, indicate this by clicking on the Ί agree' button. If you do not agree, click Ί decline.' "10° In
the second illustration, the first computer screen asks the potential licensee

to enter a name, address and credit card number. After entering the information, and striking the "enter" key, the licensee has access to the data
and receives a monthly bill. In the center of the screen amid other languages in small print, is the statement: " 'Terms and conditions of service;
disclaimers' indicating a hyperlink to the terms. The customer's attention
is not called to the sentence, nor is the customer asked to react to it."101
The note indicates that in the first illustration, the licensee has ' 'manifest [ed] asset to the license and adopts its terms," but in the second illustration, the licensee has assented to a contract, but not to the "terms of
service."102

If the term was only made available for review after a person becomes
obligated to pay or begins its performance, it may nevertheless be enforceable provided: (i) a person has a right to a return for subsequently unacceptable disclosed terms, (ii) the record proposes a modification of the
contract, or (iii) in a case other than a mass market transaction, the parties
may have an opportunity to review a record or term in the contract.103
These provisions affirm the holdings in the recent cases involving the Gateway 2000, Inc. (Gateway) computer company.104 Consumer advocates and
some legal academics felt these provisions nevertheless represented a departure from prior law regarding the post-sale disclaimers, and rather than
preserving a consumer's right to an opportunity to review, were tantamount to imposing on consumers an obligation to scrutinize all the terms
of a merchant's form contracts.105

99. UCITA Draft Comments, supra note 72, § 1 12 n.5.
100. Id.
101. Id.

102. Id.

103. Id. §112(e)(3)(A),(B),(D).
104. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 E3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Brower v. Gateway
2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1998). In both Gateway cases dealing with post-sale disclosures, the
courts upheld the validity of the form contracts that Gateway enclosed when shipping com-

puters sold by telephone order because the purchaser had a right to return the computer
within 30 days if the terms were not acceptable. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150; Brower, 676
N.Y.S.2d at 573-75. In Brower, however, the court held the arbitration clause unconscionable
and therefore unenforceable. Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75.
105. See, e.g., Letter from 45 Law Professors, to Gene Lebrun, President of NGCUSL
(July 16, 1999), in <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/799profs.html>. One of the authors of
this Article was among the 45 law professors who signed the July 1 6, 1 999 letter. See abo
Letter from Professor Ray Nimmer, UGITA Reporter, in Response to 45 Law Professors
(July 17, 1999), in <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/rrn43.html>.
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With regard to the legal effect of attribution procedures,106 UCITA now
follows the technology neutral approach taken in UETA.107 This change
was made very shortly before UCITA was finalized. Prior to that last-

minute change, UCITA followed a more technology specific approach
designed to associate specific legal outcomes with the use of technologies
believed to be particularly reliable.108 Variations of this "technology specific" approach have already been accepted by several state legislatures in
the United States, and is being considered in some form in the proposed
EU Electronic Signature Directive, and in the draft UNCITRAL Uniform
Rules on Electronic Signatures.109
One provision in UCITA clarifies the enforceability of releases, a particular form of contract that is quite common in online environments, but
which may appear to be fatally flawed under classical contract law doctrines of consideration.110 A party distributing information over the Inter-

net may want to condition access to that information on an agreement
from each party accessing it that the provider will not be sued if the
accessing party is dissatisfied with or aggrieved by the content. For ex106. An "attribution procedure" is defined as
a procedure established by law, administrative rule, or agreement, or a procedure otherwise adopted by the parties, to verify that an electronic event is that of a specific
person or to detect changes or errors in the information. The term includes a procedure
that requires the use of algorithms or other codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption, callback or other acknowledgment, or any other procedures that are reasonable under the circumstances.

UCITA, supra note 36, § 102(a)(5).

107. UCITA §214 now provides:
(a) An electronic event is attributed to a person if it was the act of that person or its
electronic agent, or the person is otherwise bound by it under the law of agency or
other law. The party relying on attribution of an electronic event to another person has
the burden of establishing attribution.

(b) The act of a person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the
efficacy of an attribution procedure.
(c) The effect of an electronic act attributed to a person under subsection (a) is deter-

mined from the context and surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation,
execution, or adoption, including the parties' agreement, if any, and otherwise as provided by law.

Id. §214.
108. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
109. For an analysis of digital signature laws enacted by state legislatures in the U.S., see
McBride Baker & Coles, supra note 2. For a discussion of the EU draft Electronic Signature
Directive and the UNCITRAL Uniform Rules on Electronic Signatures, see infra text accompanying notes 1 76-78 and 225-30.
110. UCITA, supra note 36, § 207. This section provides in part: "A release is effective
without consideration if it is: (1) in a record to which the releasing party agrees, such as by
manifesting assent, and which identifies the informational rights released; or (2) enforceable
under estoppel, implied license, or other rules of law." Id.
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ample, a party maintaining an Internet "chat room" might require anyone
wishing to read the messages to release the chat room operator from any
liability for the content of the messages. It may be hard to argue, though,
that when the accessing party agrees not to sue the chat room operator,
even if the content of messages posted in the chat room would otherwise
be actionable, that should constitute the consideration offered by the accessing party, making the release a valid contract. While the chat room
operator could still raise estoppel arguments if an agreement not to sue
was found not to be consideration, the chat room operator may be concerned about the enforceability of the release agreement against the accessing party and the chat room operator may simply shut down the chat

room.111

The choice of law112 and choice of forum113 provisions in UCITA
would give merchants entering into electronic contracts greater certainty
that they would not be forced to litigate disputed transactions in remote
jurisdictions.114 UCITA provides that the parties may choose the applicable law governing their transactions without any limitation, such as requiring the jurisdiction whose law was chosen to bear a reasonable relationship to the transaction. It also provides, however, that this choice will
not be "enforceable in a consumer contract to the extent it would vary a
rule that may not be varied by agreement under the law of the jurisdiction
whose law would apply ... in the absence of the agreement" by the parties.115 In the absence of an enforceable choice of law term, access contracts1 16 or contracts for electronic delivery of a copy are governed by the

law of the jurisdiction where the licensor is located, while a consumer
contract involving delivery of a copy on a physical medium is governed
by the law of the jurisdiction where the copy is delivered to the consumer.
In all other cases, the law of the jurisdiction with the most significant
relationship to the transaction governs.117 These rules clearly favor cer111. For a discussion of the importance to a certificate authority of conditioning access
to information contained in a certificate revocation list on receiving an enforceable agreement
from the accessing party not to sue the certificate authority for inaccurate information in the
certificate, see Jane K. Winn, The Hedgehog and the Fox: Distinguishing Public and Private Sector
Approaches to Managing Risk for Internet Transactions, 51 Admin. L. Rev. 955, 972-73 (1999).

112. UCITA, supra note 36, § 109.
113. Id. §110.
1 14. For an overview of how the choice of law provisions evolved during the U.C.C. 2B
drafting process, see Boss, supra note 74 (discussing the jurisdiction of commercial law).
1 15. UCITA, supra note 36, § 109(a).

1 16. UCITA § 102(a)(l) defines "access contract" as "a contract to obtain electronically
access to, or information from, an information processing system of another person, or the

equivalent of such access."
117. Id. § 109(b)(3). If the application of this rule points to a foreign jurisdiction which
does not provide substantially similar protections and rights to a party not located in that
jurisdiction to those provided by UCITA, then the court may apply the law of the U.S.
jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the transaction instead. Id. § 109(c).
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tainty on the part of merchants and, except in the case of mandatory
consumer protection laws,118 shift the risk of learning the substance of the

law applicable to the transaction from the merchant to the consumer. This
approach is in marked contrast to the EU approach, which currently requires all Member States to revise their consumer protection laws to provide a standardized, comprehensive array of mandatory consumer protections that apply to electronic contracting to permit merchants to follow
the law of their home country without depriving consumers of an adequate level of protection.119
The choice of forum provisions in UCITA120 are even more favorable
to merchants wishing to minimize the risk of being haled into court in a
remote jurisdiction in connection with a contract executed electronically.
Such a rule is consistent with some recent cases governing contractual
choice of forum clauses, including those in consumer contracts, such as in
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Schute.121 As a practical matter, granting such

broad discretion to the contract drafter without any limitation for its application to consumer contracts will effectively deprive many consumers
in online transactions from any effective remedy in the event of a dispute.
This approach is also in marked contrast with current proposals in the EU
to revise the 1968 Brussels Convention to apply to contracts involving new
forms of electronic communications media.122

118. It is unclear how many consumer protection laws in the United States will be found
to constitute mandatory consumer protections applicable to transactions within the scope of
UCITA. Most U.S. consumer protection laws date from the 1960s and 1970s and as a result,
may not regulate many of the special characteristics of "computer information transactions."
Cf. id. ξ 103(a).

1 19. The Distance Selling Directive was promulgated in 1997, and legislation based on
it must be enacted by the Member States by 2000. See infra notes 195-206 and accompanying
text. Under the principle of country of origin regulation and mutual recognition of regulation by Member States, a merchant need only comply with the law where the merchant is

established. Once all Member States have enacted legislation based on the Distance Selling
Directive, this will nevertheless provide consumers with a uniformly high level of protection

throughout the EU. EU Member States are also parties to the 1980 Rome Convention on
Contractual Choice of Law, which follows UCITA in limiting the enforcement of contractual
choice of law provisions where they conflict with a mandatory consumer protection law. See

Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19, 1998, 80/934/
EEC, 1980 OJ. (L 266) 1, 19 I.L.M. 1942 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Rome Convention]. It
is unclear if the application of Member State law based on the Distance Selling Directive
would constitute not providing "substantially similar protections and rights" to the merchant

under UCITA § 109(c), and thus permit a US. court to apply U.S. law instead of the law of
a Member State to a transaction involving a consumer in Europe.
120. UCITA § 1 10 provides "[t]he parties in their agreement may choose an exclusive
judicial forum unless the choice is unreasonable and unjust [and that a] choice-of-forum term
is not exclusive unless the agreement expressly so provides." UCITA, supra note 36, S 1 10.
121. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). In one case involving an arbitration clause in a Gateway computer form contract, the court upheld the provision. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d
1 147, 1 150 (7th Cir. 1997). In another, the arbitration clause was held to be unconscionable.
Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 575 (1998).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 179-94.
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UCITA contains several provisions that its proponents hail as important
new consumer protections. The concept of "mass market" covers both
consumer transactions and other transactions involving software or computer information offered to the general public under substantially identical terms.123 Supporters of the software industry were critical of using
the concept of "mass market" to define the scope of what would otherwise
be protections limited to consumers because of the increased burdens this
would impose on software developers licensing their products to business
users.124 Consumer representatives were uncomfortable with the substitution of the concept of mass market for consumer, in what would otherwise have been consumer protection provisions, due to concerns that the
result would be to reduce the substance of the statutory protections provided to less sophisticated parties or parties with grossly unequal bargaining power to offset its wider coverage.125 Although the notion of mass
market was never removed from the text of UCITA, the drafting committee's enthusiasm for it waned as the drafting process continued, and
some protections in the final draft that might have applied to mass market

transactions apply only to consumers instead.126

The general rule governing when a party will be deemed to have

adopted specific terms of a contract is contained in section 29 of UCITA.
The general rule states that if a party agrees to a record containing a term,

by manifesting assent or otherwise, the party has adopted all the terms in
the record, without regard to whether the party actually knew of or understood those terms, and without regard to whether the terms were only
made available to the party after performance or use began under the
agreement.127 This rule formalizes a concept described in the reporter's
123. UCITA § 102(a)(46) defines a "mass-market transaction" as:
(A) a consumer contract; or (B) any other transaction with an end-user licensee if: (i) the
transaction is for information or informational rights directed to the general public as
a whole including consumers, under substantially the same terms for the same information; (ii) the licensee acquires the information or rights in a retail transaction under
terms and in a quantity consistent with an ordinary transaction in a retail market; and
(iii) the transaction is not: (I) a contract for redistribution or for public performance or

public display of a copyrighted work; (II) a transaction in which the information is
customized or otherwise specially prepared by the licensor for the licensee other than
minor customization using a capability of the information intended for that purpose;
(III) a site license; or (IV) an access contract.
UCITA, suara note 36, § 102(aV46).

124. See, e.g., Carol Kunze, Hot Button Issue: Mass Market Licenses (Mar. 13, 1999), in
<http://www.2bguide.com/hbimmvc.html>.
125. See, e.g., Memorandum from Gail Hillebrand, Consumers Union, to Uniform Law
Commissioners (July 1997), in <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/cun.html>.
126. See, e.g., UCITA, supra note 36, § 216 (governing consumer defenses to electronic
errors that occur in automated transactions when no reasonable method to detect and correct

the error has been provided).

127. Id. §209.
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notes as "layered contracting."128 The application of this general rule is
modified slightly for mass market contracts by providing that a party will
be deemed to have adopted a term in a mass market license only if the
term was made available before performance or use began, or during the
initial use or performance, and providing that the term is not unconscionable or in conflict with terms to which the parties expressly agreed.129 In
addition, if a party does not have an opportunity to review the terms of
a mass market license before becoming obligated to pay and the party
decides to decline the license after having actually reviewed the terms, the
declining party is entitled to return whatever was provided and to be reimbursed for any reasonable expenses incurred in the return, including
any expenses incurred in uninstalling software from the declining party's

computer and returning it to its original condition.130 The declining
party's right to be reimbursed any expenses incurred in making the return
is supposed to create market incentives for licensors to make the terms of
mass-market licenses available before delivery.131 In general, consumer ad-

vocates have found the benefits provided by these sections to be outweighed by the harm caused by codifying recent case law in this area,
which has frequently been unfavorable to consumers.132
U.S. FEDERAL INITIATIVES

Federal legislators have been considering whether uniform fed
in this area might be warranted, given that Congress can often a
quickly than the states acting through the ULC, and with greater
as to the uniformity of the final outcome.133 The variations amon
ent state approaches to enabling the use of new electronic commun
media are very substantial in number, even if they are ultimately
be relatively limited in scope, or not to be very different in subs
application. Furthermore, a clear, consistent approach articulate
federal government would permit the United States to speak with

128. UCITA Draft Comments, supra note 72, § 208 n.3 (citing case law support

concept of rolling or layering contract processes: ProCD, Inc. v. £eidenberg, 86 Ε 3d
Cir. 1996) (stating that shrinkwrap terms were part of contract); Brower v. Gateway

676 N.YS.2d 569 (1998)).
129. UCITA, supra note 36, § 210(a).
130. Id. §210(b).

131. UCITA Draft Comments, supra note 72, § 210 n.4(c); see abo UCITA, supra

§210(b).
1 32. See, e.g., Letter from Professor Jean Braucher and Professor Mark Budnitz,

of the Working Group on Consumer Protection, American Bar Association
Law Section, Cyberspace Law Committee, to NCCUSL (June 10, 1999), in
www.2bguide.com/docs/jbmb699.html>.

133. Philip S. Corwin, Electronic Authentication: The Emerging Federal Role, 38 JU

261,262(1998).
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voice in its dealings with the EU. Such a unified position may be necessary
to reduce the possibility that the EU approach to electronic contracting
law would become the de facto global standard by virtue of its more uniform

application over a unified economy that is now larger than the U.S. economy, which might harm the competitive position of U.S. firms offering
electronic commerce products and services that do not comply with the
EU standard.

Although federal reform of contract law to support electronic commerce

may seem like a much simpler, more direct solution to the problems that
the ULC and individual state legislatures have been grappling with for
some time, it may also cause problems that could be avoided by reforming
contract law through the uniform law process or individual state legislation. A great deal of contract law is still substantially defined by state law,

whether in the form of state statutes such as the U.C.C. or in case law

clarified by the first and second Restatements of Contracts. Federal interven-

tion to minimize state law writing and signature requirements may have
major, unintended consequences in many bodies of law beyond what is
normally thought of as "contract law," including such bodies of law as
negotiable instruments law, trusts and estate law, real property law and
consumer protection law.134
105TH CONGRESS

In the 105th congressional session, many bills were introduced dealing
with electronic commerce issues, but the only significant bill to become
law was the Government Paperwork Elimination Act,135 which permits
the federal government to accept digital signatures.136 Among the bills that

were not enacted were special interest legislation permitting regulated
financial institutions to become major providers of online authentication

services.137 This bill included provisions that would establish a self-

regulatory organization (SRO) to oversee providers of such services, simi-

lar to the role played by SROs such as the National Association of Se-

curities Dealers in other financial services industries.

134. See, e.g., New Jersey Law Revision Commission, New Jersey Law Revision Commission
Opposes Federal Ce-Commerce' Preemption Bills H.R. 1714 and S. 761, in <http://www.lawrev.
state.nj .us/siç /fedbills.htm> .

135. It was enacted as part of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
112 Stat. 2681-2749 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. ch. 35).
136. Proposed guidelines for the implementation of the Government Paperwork Elimination Act were published on March 5, 1999. See Management of Federal Information
Resources, 64 Fed. Reg. 10,896 (Mar. 5, 1999). The comment period on the proposed guidelines closed on July 5, 1999.
137. Digital Signature and Electronic Authentication Law of 1998, S. 1594, 105th Cong.

(1998).
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106TH CONGRESS

In 1999, two important bills that would apply to electronic commerce
were introduced in Congress. House Bill 1714, the "Electronic Signatures
in Global and National Commerce Act,"138 and Senate Bill 761, the
"Third Millennium Electronic Commerce Act."139 Both seek to create a

level national playing field for electronic commerce by preempting outdated state laws requiring manual signatures and paper writings, and eliminating the bewildering array of different approaches taken by recent states

to promote electronic commerce. Both congressional bills 1714 and 761

show the influence of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Com-

merce140 and the UETA; however, both bills have been criticized by th
ULC141 and the U.S. Department of Commerce142 as more radical than
the UETA and as unworkable within a federal legal system. In light of
the controversy surrounding the proposed federal legislation in 1 999, it
unclear whether either bill is likely to be enacted in its current form.
The scope of both bills is wider than the UETA because they apply t
commercial transactions affecting interstate commerce, and have muc
more limited exclusions.143 Before enacting the UETA, state legislatur
are encouraged to review various bodies of existing law to determine i
the list of exemptions provided in the UETA is appropriate, or should
supplemented. Because these federal bills would preempt all state law i
this area, there would be no such mechanism for fine-tuning the scope

the law at the state level. For example, the UETA excludes the U.C.

from its scope in order to avoid disturbing conflating electronic funds trans
fers from negotiable instruments, or writing requirements that were writte

into statutes notwithstanding the availability of electronic alternatives.1

138. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, H.R. 1714, 106

Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Electronic Signatures Act].
139. Third Millennium Electronic Commerce Act, S. 761, 106th Cong. (1999) [herei
after Third Millennium Act] .
140. See infra text accompanying notes 210-24.

141. See Letter from John McCabe, Legal Counsel, NCCUSL, to Interested Parties (Jul

6, 1999), in <http://www.webcom.com/legaled/ETAForum/docs/7699jm.html>; Lett
from John McCabe, Legal Counsel, NCCUSL, to Members of the Commerce Committ
Congress of the United States (June 17, 1999), in <http://www.webcom.com/legale

ETAForum/docs/ 1 7 1 4jm.html>.
142. Letter from Andrew J. Pincus, Department of Commerce, to Representative Tom

Bliley, Chairman, Committee on Commerce (Aug. 4, 1999), in <http://www.civics.co
content/fedleg/doc-l 7 14-opposed.htm>.
143. While House Bill 1714 excludes wills, codicils, trusts, adoption, divorce, and fami
law matters, Senate Bill 761 excludes government transactions. Electronic Signatures Ac
supra note 138, § 103; Third Millennium Act, supra note 139, § 4(8) (defining "[transactio
as "an action . . . between 2 or more persons" (emphasis added)). Neither statute has
exception for land transactions.
144. UETA, supra note 24, § 3. See, e.g, U.C.C. Article 4A (1995) (regulating electron
funds transfers). U.C.C. § 4A-202(c)(ii) provides that a bank's customer may be liable for

unauthorized funds transfer if "the customer expressly agreed in wnting to be bound by an
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Both bills would create pressure on state legislatures to adopt the UETA
in order to avoid this kind of radical preemption of signature and writing
requirements across a state's existing laws.145
In addition, the proposed federal legislation does not exclude consumer
transactions, and may have very serious negative consequences for consumers using electronic contracting technologies unless special provisions
applicable to consumer transactions are added. The federal bills defer to
party autonomy in very general terms,146 with no specific qualifications to

deal with situations where the parties have grossly disparate bargaining
power. 147 This problem has been addressed in UETA and in EU legislation
by providing certain minimum procedural safeguards for consumers in
electronic contracting situations that prevent, for example, a merchant
using a pre-printed standard form paper contract to secure a consumer's
agreement to receive future notices electronically.148

payment order, whether or not authorized, issued in its name and accepted by the bank in
compliance with the security procedure chosen by the customer." Id. § 4A-202(c)(ii) (emphasis

added).
145. Electronic Signatures Act, supra note 138, § 102; Third Millennium Act, supra note
139, § 6. While it may be helpful to apply this kind of pressure to some states that may not
have yet focused, mandating a very general enabling statute in the form of the UETA may
not represent progress in all contexts. For example, in 1 998, the New Jersey Law Revision
Commission completed an intensive multi-year study of how to revise its laws to eliminate
obstacles to electronic commerce. The commission came to the conclusion that the unin-

tended consequences of a general overlay statute in the form of the UETA might offset the
intended benefits, and proposed instead several minor changes in specific laws. See New Jersey
Law Revision Commission, Final Report Relating to Electronic Records and Signatures (Oct. 1998),
in <http: / / www.lawrev.state.nj .us/sig/frpt.pdf> .

146. House Bill 1714 provides that "jw]ith respect to any contract or agreement entered
into in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, the parties to such contract or agreement

may establish reasonable requirements regarding the types of electronic records and electronic signatures acceptable to such parties." Electronic Signatures Act, supra note 138,
§ 101(b). Senate Bill 761 provides that "[t]he parties to a contract may agree on the terms
and conditions on which they will use and accept electronic signatures and electronic records,
including the methods therefore, in commercial transactions affecting interstate commerce.
Nothing in this subsection requires that any party enter into such a contract." Third Millennium Act, supra note 139, § 6(b).

147. The same issue is raised with the very general language affirming the principle of
freedom of contract in UCITA. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
148. For example, the federal bills have no provisions that correspond to a provision in
UETA providing that even between parties who have agreed to communicate electronically,
a legal requirement that information be provided in writing is only met if the information
is provided in a format that the recipient can retain. UETA, supra note 24, § 8(a); see supra
text accompanying notes 55-68. In the EU Distance Selling Directive, the merchant must
provide certain information to consumers regarding contracts executed online in writing or
another durable medium available and accessible to the consumer. Distance Selling Directive, supra note 91, art. 5; see infra text accompanying notes 195-206.
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EU INITIATIVES

In 1997, the Commission announced its intention to create a co

legal framework within Europe for electronic commerce by

2000. 149 As a result, various proposals to regulate different aspects of

tronic contracting are currently pending in the EU. Even the most
oriented of the proposals, the draft directive governing electron
merce (draft EC Directive)150 is more comprehensive, more regulat
more protective of consumers than any legislation currently pen
the United States. The draft electronic signature directive (draft
rective)151 is a highly technical statute aimed at regulating only

aspects of electronic commerce and is not intended to amend

laws governing contract formation.152 Proposals to modify the 19
sels Convention and the 1980 Rome Convention, which today gov
enforceability of contractual choice of law provisions, with a new

Regulation and a new Rome Regulation would make the law o

sumer's jurisdiction the applicable law for electronic commerce t
tions, and would make the consumer's home state the appropriat
as well. The proposed Brussels Regulation could effectively nullif
effort in the draft EC Directive to guarantee that application of t
try of origin and mutual recognition principles apply to the regu
electronic commerce in Europe. The draft EC Directive would pe
merchants engaged in electronic contracting within the EU to com
with the applicable law of their home country, eliminating the
such merchants to comply with the law of each Member State ind
This possible erosion of one of the fundamental premises of the E

149. See Electronic Commerce: Commission Presents Framework for Future Action (visite

1999), in <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/infso/313.htm>.
150. In November 1998, the Commission adopted the Proposal for a Europea
ment and Council Directive on Certain Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce
ternal Market, COM(98)586 final [hereinafter Draft EC Directive]. On September
in response to comments from the Parliament and the Economic and Social Co

the Commission issued an Amended Proposal for a European Parliament an
Directive on Certain Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce in the Interna
COM(1 999)427 final, available in <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/e
eleccomm/com427en.pdf>.
151. Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on a Common

work for Electronic Signatures, COM(98)297 final, available in <http://www.ispo.c

policy/com98297.html> [hereinafter 1998 Draft ES Directive]. On April 29, 19
sponse to comments from the Parliament, the Economic and Social Committe
Committee of the Regions, the Commission issued an Amended Proposal for a
Parliament and Council Directive on a Common Framework for Electronic Si
COM(99)195 final, available in <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/m
signamen.pdf>.
152. Political Agreement on a Common Position of the Council on a Frame
Electronic Signatures (Apr. 22, 1999), in <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/d
media/sign/composen.htm> [hereinafter Political Agreement].
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Market is all the more surprising in light of the recent enactment of a
Distance Selling Directive,153 which requires each Member State to revise
its consumer protection law to provide special new protections to consumers making purchases online or by telephone.
PROPOSED ELECTRONIC COMMERCE DIRECTIVE

In November 1998, the Commission proposed a draft directive design
to create a legal framework for electronic commerce within the Europe

Union in order to facilitate cross border electronic commerce transactions.

The draft EC Directive incorporates the fundamental principles of the
internal market, country of origin, and mutual recognition, as reaffirmed
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in a number of cases involving
the free movement of goods and services, beginning with the landmark
Cassis de Dijon case.154 The Commission is seeking to ensure that existing
EU and national legislation is effectively enforced. The draft EC Directive
would accomplish this through application of the principle of mutual recognition155 and the development of codes of conduct at the EU level.156
Furthermore, it aims to increase cross border cooperation between national regulatory authorities in the Member States and by setting up of
an effective cross-border dispute resolution system.157 The draft EC Directive, however, would not override the 1980 Rome Convention on Applicable Law for Contractual Obligations or the 1968 Brussels Convention
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgements.158 These conventions,

together with the new Brussels Regulation and the proposed Rome Regulation, have the effect of undermining the country of origin and mutual
recognition principles.
The draft EC Directive would govern much more than electronic contracting if it is enacted. It would regulate the establishment of electronic
commerce Internet service providers (ISPs),159 electronic commercial com-

153. Distance Selling Directive, supra note 91. In addition, the Commission has proposed
a directive that would cover distance selling of financial services. See Proposal Concerning
Distance Marketing, supra note 91. This proposal was amended on July 26, 1999.

154. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein,
1979 E.C.R. 649, [1978-79 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 18543 (Feb. 20,
1979).

155. Draft EC Directive, supra note 150, art. 3.
156. Id. art. 16.
157. /</. arts. 17-19.
158. Id. art. 1.

159. Id. arts. 4-5. The draft EC Directive would not only clarify the law, but would also
make the operation of electronic marketplaces more transparent to prospective customers
by requiring merchants doing business online to reveal the merchant's identity, physical location, email address, VAT number, and, where applicable, registration in a trade register
and license to engage in a regulated trade. Id. art. 5
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munications,160 and the liability of intermediaries.161 The draft EC Directive also attempts to reduce the current legal uncertainty surrounding
the issue of establishment by providing a definition of the state of establishment in line with principles established by the EU Treaty and the case
law of theECJ.162
One important principle that the draft EC Directive would establish is
that Member States may not impose any requirement of prior authorization on Internet electronic commerce activities.163 The purpose of this
Article is to reinforce the principle of freedom to provide services by facilitating access to the supply of services on the Internet. It constitutes a
"right to a site," which can be exercised by any natural or legal person
wishing to provide electronic commerce services over the Internet. This
provision prevents Member States from maintaining and introducing any
legislation requiring prior authorization or licensing before Internet sites
can be set up for electronic commerce services. It does not override existing

requirements for professional qualifications or authorizations by a professional body for the provision of services, however, which are not exclusively
aimed at electronic commerce services.164

Article 5 sets out the minimum information (e.g., the name, place of
establishment and e-mail address, and VAT registration) which the ISP
must give to consumers.165 It supplements the information requirements
that exist in the distance selling directive on the protection of consumers
in relation to distance contracts. It also extends the provisions of the distance selling directive by obligating the ISP to provide the information,
even where no contract is to be formed. The information in question must
be easily accessible from the service being provided, for example, by clicking on an icon or a logo with hypertext link to the page containing the
information which should be visible on all the pages of the web site. Prices,
indicated in Euros, will meet the price information requirement laid down

in this Article.

160. Id. arts. 6-7.

161. Id. arts. 12-15. These articles provide an exemption from liability for ISPs if they act
as mere conduits for the transmission of information, authorize temporary storage of information through systems "caching" limits the liability of the ISP for content posted by others

if the ISP is not aware of the illegal activity, and states that ISPs are under no general
obligation to monitor third party content placed on their sites. Id.
162. The right of establishment is the right to set up agencies, branches, or subsidiaries
by nationals of any Member State in the territory of any other Member State and is guar-

anteed by Article 43 of the Treaty establishing the European Community as amended by
the Treaty of Amsterdam. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
art. 43 (ex. art. 52), available in 1 EUROPEAN UNION Law Guide (Phillip Raworth ed., 1999).
See, e.g., Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgian State, 2 C.M.L.R. 305 (1974).
163. Draft EC Directive, supra note 150, art. 4, f 1.
164. Id. art 4, f 2.
165. Id. art 5.
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The Commission believes that commercial communications, for instance advertising, sponsorship, direct marketing, and promotions, are a
fundamental part of the majority of electronic commerce services.166
Therefore, the draft EC Directive defines what constitutes "commercial
communications"167 and makes such communications subject to certain
rules regarding transparency in order to ensure consumer confidence and
fair trading. It establishes the principle that commercial communications
must be clearly identifiable as such by consumers; for example, commercial
communications should not be hidden in the form of an advertisement.

The person on whose behalf the commercial communication is carried
out must also be clearly identified.168 For example, the banner could carry
the company's name, icon, or logo with a hypertext link to the page containing this information. This link should be visible on all the pages of the
site. In an effort to suppress "spamming," the draft EC Directive requires

electronic commerce businesses to ensure that commercial communica-

tions by e-mail are clearly identifiable in order to prevent harmful intrusion

into consumer privacy.169 The draft EC Directive also states that regulated
professions (e.g., lawyers and accountants) should be permitted to use commercial communications provided they comply with the professional codes
of conduct drawn up by national professional associations.170
The draft EC Directive states that Member States should amend their

laws to ensure that contracts concluded electronically are genuinely and
effectively workable in law and in practice.171 Member States will be required to repeal provisions that prohibit or restrict the use of electronic
media for contracting, and refrain from preventing the use of certain electronic systems such as intelligent electronic agents for contracting.172 They

must also refrain from creating a two-tier system which gives electronic
contracts less legal effect than paper contracts, and repeal formal contrac-

tual requirements which cannot be met by electronic means or create
ambiguities when applied to electronic contracts.173 Merchants wishing to
enter into contracts online must explain clearly and unequivocally prior
to the formation of the contract what steps will be involved in concluding
the contract, whether the contract will be accessible after it is effective and

what procedures will be used for handling errors. Member States must
take steps to ensure that electronic contracts are only formed after the
166. /</. pmbl.,1[lO.
167. Id. art. 2(e).

168. Id. art. 6(b).
169. Id. art. 7.
170. Id. art. 8.

171. /</.pmbl.,f 13.
172. Id. art. 9. Exceptions are made for contracts that require "the involvement of a
notary," which must be "registered with a public authority" in order to be valid, which are
"governed by family law," or "the law of succession." Id.
173. Id.
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parties have given their full and informed consent to the contract.174 In
addition, the draft EC Directive clarifies the moment of the conclusion of
a contract in certain cases, and requires that end-users of online contracting services must be provided with effective means of identifying and correcting errors and accidental transactions.175
PROPOSED ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE DIRECTIVE

In May 1998, the Commission proposed an electronic signature dire
tive to regulate the use of electronic signature technologies in Europe.
draft ES Directive was aimed at harmonizing the various approaches be
taken by Member States to regulate electronic signature technologies

1998, the Commission found that several Member States had alre

started detailed legislative initiatives related to electronic signatures, a
that the actual use of this technology might be hindered by the existe
of multiple, inconsistent regulatory regimes within Europe.176 The dr
ES Directive is not intended to "apply to electronic signatures exclusiv
within closed systems," such as those maintained by a corporation for

own internal network.177

The draft ES Directive would establish a legal framework for certain
certification services provided to the public.178 It sets up common requirements for certification service providers (CSPs) to ensure cross-border recognition of signatures and certificates within the EU. It further attempts
to maintain a technology-neutral perspective and does not mandate the
use of any particular electronic signature technology. On the one hand,

the draft ES Directive provides that CSPs should be able to enter the
market for certification services without prior authorization to ensure that
markets for these services develop freely. On the other hand, the Member
States are authorized to establish voluntary accreditation schemes to pro-

mote the availability of responsible services to the public. In order to
promote public confidence in these technologies, the draft ES Directive
provides that CSPs shall be liable for the validity of the contents of certificates they issue.

1 74. Id. art. 10. This approach is in marked contrast with the more sweeping affirmations

of the principles of party autonomy and freedom of contract contained in proposed U.S.
federal legislation and UCITA. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77, 146.
175. Id. art 1 1. This article provides that if a contract is formed by an end-user giving
assent to an offer through a technological means, such as clicking on an icon, the contract
is concluded when the end-user receives an acknowledgment of receipt of that manifestation
of assent from the other party.

1 76. Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on a Common Framework for Electronic Signatures, COM(98)297 final, in <http://www/europa.eu.int/comm/

dgl5/en/media/infso/com297en.pdf>.
177. Political Agreement, supra note 152.
178. 1998 Draft ES Directive, supra note 151.
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PROPOSED BRUSSELS AND ROME REGULATIONS
The EU first addressed the choice of law problem in international con-

sumer contracts with the 1980 Rome Convention.179 Under Article 3 of

the Rome Convention, the parties to a contract are free to select the
governing law; however, Article 5 provides that a choice of law provision
in a consumer contract may not deprive the consumer of the benefit of
mandatory consumer protection laws in effect in the consumer's country
of habitual residence.180 Such mandatory consumer protection laws include those prohibiting unfair contract terms, limiting the enforceability
of standard for contracts, creating rights of cancellation during a "cooling
off" period following the formation of the contract, or requiring that
certain disclosures be made by the seller.181 These choice of law provisions
have a dispute resolution counterpart in the 1968 Brussels Convention,
which governs questions of judicial jurisdiction among various European
countries. Article 13 of the Brussels Convention provides that while a
consumer has the option to bring suit against a business in either the
consumer's or the business' home country, the business may only bring
suit against the consumer in the consumer's country.
In July 1999, the Commission adopted a draft Regulation on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters.182
When adopted by the Council of Ministers, this regulation will replace
and update the 1968 Brussels Convention in order to take account of new

forms of commerce that did not exist in 1968.183 Article 15 of the draft

Brussels Regulation provides that the courts of a consumer's country of
habitual residence have jurisdiction over suppliers of goods and services
located in other Member States of the EU.184 Recital 13 of the proposed
Brussels Regulation makes clear that any EU merchant who operates an
electronic commerce web site that can be accessed by a consumer will be
at risk of being haled into court in the country of the consumer's habitual

1 79. 1980 Rome Convention, supra note 119; see Matthew S. Yeo & Marco Berlin, Conflict

Looms Over Choice of Law in Internet Transactions, 4 Elec. Com. & L. Rep. (BNA) 85, 86
(Jan. 27, 1999).
180. 1980 Rome Convention, supra note 1 19, art 3.
181. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, OJ. C027 of 26/01/98 (498Y0 1.26(01)) [hereinafter 1968
Brussels Convention]. The Convention applies to all EU Member States and, by the 1988
Lugano Convention, to the members of the European Free Trade Association.
1 82. Proposal for a Council Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments

in Civil and Commercial Matters, July 14, 1999, COM(99)348 final [hereinafter Proposed
Brussels Regulation].
183. Id. The entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty on May 1, 1999, obviates the need
to have this regulation enacted as a convention agreed to by signatory nations. The subject
matter of the convention is now within the competence of the Commission to address by
regulations prepared for adoption by the Council of Ministers.
184. Id. art. 15.
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residence in the event of litigation with the consumer.185 This would be
true even if the merchant operating the electronic commerce web site had
not taken any steps beyond posting its home page on the Internet and had
taken no more active steps to target consumers located outside the Mem-

ber State where the merchant's business was established. This is a stricter

standard than the one contained in Article 13 of the Brussels Convention,
which provides that a merchant is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts

of the consumer's country only if the conclusion of the contract was
preceded by a specific invitation addressed to the consumer or by purchasing advertising targeted at the country of the consumer's habitual
residence, and the consumer took the steps necessary to conclude the contract from within the consumer's own country.186

The Schlosser Report187 (one of the two official reports on the Brussels
Convention) states that the appropriate jurisdiction is the country where
the consumer resides if the trader has taken steps to market his goods and
services there.188 Such steps cover, inter alia, mail order and doorstep selling.

The trader must have taken action aimed specifically at that country, such
as advertising in the press, on the radio or television, in the cinema, or by
mailing catalogues, or he must have made a business proposal individually
through an intermediary or representative, or by canvassing to qualify.
The Schlosser Report expressly refers to the Report on the Obligations

Convention, which gives the following example: If a German makes a
contract in response to an advertisement published by a French company

in a German publication, the contract will be covered by the special
rules.189 If, on the other hand, the German replies to advertisements in
U.S. publications, even if they are sold in Germany, the rule does not apply
unless the advertisements appeared in special editions of the publication

185. Id. pmbl.51[ 13.
186. 1968 Brussels Convention, supra note 181, art. 13.
187. Peter Schlosser, Report to the Convention on the Association of the Kingdom of
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial
Matters and the Protocol on its Interpretation by the Court of Justice, Oct. 9, 1978, app. 1
(on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law) [hereinafter Schlosser Report] .
188. Id. If 158.

189. Professors Giuliano & Lagarde, Report on the Obligations Convention, OJ. 1980
C282/4, quoted in STEPHEN O'MALLEY & ALEXANDER LaYTON, EUROPEAN ClVIL PRACTICE 504 n.58 (1989) [hereinafter Report on the Obligations Convention]. " '[S]pecial rules'
of jurisdiction" is defined as "directly designating the competent court without referring to
the rules of jurisdiction in force in the State where such a court might be situated . ..." Id.
For special rules to apply, there "must be a close connecting factor between the dispute and
the court with jurisdiction to resolve it." See P. Jenard, Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968,
app. 1, § 2, arts. 5, 6 (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of

Law).
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intended for European countries.190 The Schlosser Report also argues that
consumer contracts, other than those where the trader has taken steps to
target the consumer in some way, should be subject to the special provisions only if there is a sufficiently strong connection with the place where
the consumer is domiciled.191 It is clear from the above comparison of the
provisions of Article 1 3 of the existing Brussels Convention and Article
1 5 of the proposed Brussels Regulation that much stricter rules are being
imposed on electronic commerce transactions than were originally mandated for more traditional cross-border transactions.

The approach taken in the proposed Brussels Regulation is clearly at
odds with the approach taken in the draft EC Directive. The proposed
Brussels Regulation seems to indicate a lack of appreciation on the part
of its drafters of the differences between establishing a passive Internet
web site that may be accessed by individuals anywhere in the world, and
a trader either purchasing advertising targeted at a consumer in the consumer's home or using the mail to solicit a consumer.192 Such efforts to
preserve the rights of consumers shift the cost of litigating in a remote
jurisdiction from the consumer to the merchant. While multinational corporations may be prepared to live with this risk, it may have a chilling
effect on small and medium-sized enterprises considering the use of the
Internet for marketing and contracting. The proposed Brussels Regulation's focus on preserving the consumer's right to litigate under the consumer's law and in the consumer's own courts does not seem to take into

account the efforts underway to harmonize Member State consumer protection law through legislation based on the requirements of the Distance
Selling Directive, and the alternative dispute resolution provisions of the
draft EC Directive, which might reduce the expense of resolving disputes

for both merchants and consumers.

The proposed Rome Regulation deals with non-contractual liability.
Currently a Council Working Party, composed of experts from the Member States is discussing the Austrian President's proposal for the Rome
Regulation. Of particular significance to electronic commerce is Article 6
of the Austrian Presidency's draft which deals with the applicable law in
respect of unfair competition and unfair practices. This Article states that
the law applicable to obligations arising from unfair competition or unfair
practices shall be the law of the country where the competitive action or
unfair practice affects competitive relations or collective consumer interest.

If the provisions of Article 6 are adopted in their current form, it would
mean that a United Kingdom (U.K.) company using the Internet to trade

on a pan-European basis would not be able to take advantage of the

principles of home country control and mutual recognition in the event a
190. Report on the Obligations Convention, supra note 189.

191. Id.^ 159.
192. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.

This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Mon, 08 Jan 2018 18:37:05 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Cyberspace: Frontiers of Electronic Contracting Law 489

claim for unfair competition or trade practices were made against the
company. This could also be a significant factor undermining the willingness of small and medium-sized enterprises to undertake electronic commerce activities, because substantial variations remain in the competition
and unfair trade practices laws of different Member States. For example,
if a U.K. merchant were to use its Internet site to offer promotions or
discounts on consumer purchases or the use of certain types of marketing
techniques (for example, buy a packet of cornflakes and get the opportunity to win a holiday or purchase two pairs of shoes and get a third pair
free), which are perfectly legal under English law, the provisions of Article
6 would mean that the trader could fall foul of the unfair competition laws
of other Member States (for example, Germany) where such trading practices are illegal. While the costs of assuring that web site content conforms
to the different competition and unfair trade practices laws of each Member State may not be prohibitive for multinational corporations, they might

well be prohibitive for small and medium-sized enterprises. The proposed
Rome Regulation is thus inconsistent with other actions being taken by
the Commission, such as its stated commitment in the explanatory memorandum of the draft EC Directive to promoting electronic commerce
among small and medium-sized enterprises,193 and providing a high level
of consumer protection in electronic commerce transactions through a
variety of strategies in addition to reliance of special jurisdictional rules.194
DISTANCE SEIZING DIRECTIVE

In 1997, the EU adopted a directive (the Distance Selling Directive)
the protection of consumers in respect to distance contracts.195 The D
tance Selling Directive is supposed to promote online commerce by p
viding consumers with a guarantee that they will be protected by th
own national consumer protection regime when they enter into dist
selling contracts.196 Distance selling is defined as the conclusion of a

193. Draft EC Directive, supra note 150, pmbl., f 2. It is ironic that on July 2, 1999,

Commission decided to bring proceedings against Germany in the ECJ in respect

unfair competition law which severely regulates promotional offers, discounts and free g

1 94. Explanatory Memorandum for the Proposal for a European Parliament and Co
Directive on Certain Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce in the Internal Market
18, 1998), COM(98)586 final, in <http://www.europa.ev.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/
comm/com 586en.pdf>. The additional strategies include: lessening the risk of illegal a
ities, imposing information and transparency obligations on merchants so consumers

the information they need to make informed choices, guaranteeing fair contracting and e

correction procedures, and promoting codes of conduct and alternative dispute resolu
processes.

195. Distance Selling Directive, supra note 91. The Member States have until May 20,
2000, to enact national laws embodying the terms of the Distance Selling Directive. Id.
art. 15.

196. Id. art. 12.
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tract regarding goods or services whereby the contract between the consumer and the supplier takes place by means of technology for communication at a distance.197 Consumers felt the need for special protections

in this area because of the risks of invasions to individual privacy by
aggressive marketing techniques, inadequate or improper information being provided to the consumer by the supplier, and risks of fraud or error
in card payment services used to make payments under distance selling
contracts. In addition, the rights granted consumers through the enactment of the Distance Selling Directive's provisions into national law may
not be waived by the consumer.198 The Distance Selling Directive contains

an analog to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission's Mail Order Rule,199
which requires that a transaction be completed within thirty days or notice

must be sent to the consumer of the situation giving the consumer the
option to cancel the transaction.200 The Distance Selling Directive covers
most forms of direct marketing, including catalog mail order, telephone
sales, direct response television sales, newspapers, magazines, and electronic communications such as e-mail.201 The Distance Selling Directive
requires that a consumer must be given certain minimum information,
both at the time of contract solicitation and at or before the time of

delivery.202 Written confirmation of information must be received by the

consumer in some form of "durable medium" accessible to the con-

sumer.203 Consumers must, subject to certain exceptions, also be given
"cooling off" period of at least seven working days.204 Where the con
sumer exercises his or her right of withdrawal from the contract, the sup-

plier is obliged to reimburse the consumer for any sums paid. Cold-callin
of consumers by telephone, fax, or e-mail is not permitted unless the

consumer has consented.205

In an effort to protect merchants from unreasonable burdens in consumer transactions, certain types of transactions are exempted from the
coverage of certain Distance Selling Directive protections.206 For example,
unless the parties have otherwise agreed, the consumer's seven-day right
of withdrawal does not apply to contracts for the provision of services if
performance has begun before the seven days are up; for the supply of
goods or services the price of which is dependent on fluctuations in the
financial market which cannot be controlled by the supplier; for the supply
197. Id. art. 2, If 1.
198. Id. art. 12.
1 99. 1 5 U.S.C. S 45ίσ·ϊ Π 994V

200. Distance Selling Directive, supra note 91, art. 7.
201. Id. annex I.
202. Id. art. 4.
203. Id. art. 5.
204. Id. art. 6.
205. Id. art. 10.

206. Id. art. 6, % 3.
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of goods made to the consumer's specifications or clearly personalized, or
which are likely to deteriorate or expire rapidly; for audio or video recordings or computer software, which were unsealed by the consumer; for
the supply of newspapers, periodicals, or magazines; or for gaming or
lottery services.

UNCITRAL INITIATIVES

UNCITRAL207 is an organization based in Vienna, Austria w
velops model laws and standard documents meant to facilitate in
tional commercial transactions. Among its undertakings, UNCITR
produced the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the Internatio
of Goods, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Tran
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.208 The global scope of electronic

commerce makes UNCITRAL an obvious and logical forum for developing a consensus regarding what reforms in existing contract law are
appropriate to facilitate the continued expansion of electronic contracting.
The first UNCITRAL project to address electronic contracting directly
was the Model Law on Electronic Commerce (Model Law), which took a
rigorously media-neutral approach. The current UNCITRAL project addressing electronic contracting is the Draft Uniform Rules on Electronic
Signatures (Uniform Rules), which is more technical and regulatory in its
approach.209
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE MODEL LAW

The Model Law was completed by UNCITRAL in June 1996,210
was approved by the United Nations General Assembly in Decem

207. UNCITRAL was created in 1966 by General Assembly Resolution 2205 (XXI),

is primarily charged with oversight of international commercial law. A list of its projects

be found at UNCITRAL <http://www.uncitral.org>.

208. See Richard Hill & Ian Waiden, The Draft UNCITRAL Model Law for Electronic Comm
Issues and Solutions, 13 COMPUTER Law. 18 (1996).

209. A list of recent documents produced by UNCITRAL's WG-EC, includes progress
reports on the Draft Uniform Rules on Electronic Signatures. See UNCITRAL (visited
Oct. 10, 1999) <http://www.uncitral.org/english/sessions/wg_ec/index.htm>.
210. UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment ( 1 996),
UN. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1996, in <http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/electcom/in-

dex.htm> [hereinafter Model Law]. The Model Law and its accompanying Guide to Enactment were also published in Uncitral Model Law: UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, 7 Tul. J. Int'l & COMP. 1. 237 (1999). As adopted by the Commission in 1998, Article
5 bis on incorporation by reference provides, "[information shall not be denied legal effect,
validity or enforceability solely on the grounds that it is not contained in the data message
purporting to give rise to such legal effect, but is merely referred to in that data message."
Model Law, supra, art 5.
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1996, by non-vote resolution.211 The Model Law has been enacted in
Singapore and the Republic of Korea, and has influenced legislation in
many jurisdictions, including the United States, the state of Illinois, and
the UETA.212

The Model Law applies only to data messages used in commercial transactions, and does not override consumer protection laws.213 Data message
includes "information generated, sent, received or stored" in electronic
form, including EDI messages, e-mail, or facsimiles.214 The heart of the
Model Law is found in Article 5, which provides that "information shall
not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on the grounds
that it is [in the form of a data message]."215 A data message may meet
a legal requirement of a writing provided that the data message is in a
format that may be accessed for subsequent reference.216 A data message
meets a legal requirement of a signature if a method is used to identify a
person and indicates the person's approval of the contents of the message,
and that method is as reliable as is appropriate under the circumstances.217
A data message may also meet a legal requirement that an original document be "presented or retained."218 Data messages shall not be excluded
from evidence in a legal proceeding solely on the grounds that it is electronic or "it is not in its original form."219 Record retention requirements
may be met by retention of data messages provided that the information
they contain: may be accessed for subsequent reference, can be "demonstrated to represent accurately the information" that was stored, and if
possible, the provenance of the data message can be demonstrated.220
Attribution of a data message to its purported originator is permitted
if the originator in fact sent it, if it was sent by someone who had authority

to bind the originator, or if the originator is responsible for the programming that automatically originated the message.221 The Model Law goes
on to provide that "an addressee is entitled to regard a data message as
being that of the originator ... [i]f . . . the addressee properly applied a

211. Richard Field, 1996: Survey of the Tear's Developments in Electronic Cash Law and the Laws
Affecting Electronic Banking in the United States, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 967, 974-75. (1997).

212. UNCITRAL, Status of Conventions and Model Laws (Oct. 1, 1999), in <http://www.
uncitral.org/english/status/status.pdf>; see Boss, Electronic Commerce, supra note 8 (discussing

UNCITRAL's impact on UETA); Overby, supra note 8 (same).
213. Model Law, supra note 210, art. 1.
214. Id. art. 2(a).
215. Id. art. 5 bis.

216. Id. art. 6(1). This is similar to UETA, supra note 24, § 7 and UCITA, supra note 36,
§ 107(a). See also supra notes 50-54, 88-92 and accompanying text.
217. Model Law, supra note 210, art. 7(1).
218. Id. art. 8.
219. Id. art. 9.

220. Id. art. 10(1).
221. Id. art. 13; see UETA, supra note 24, § 9.
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procedure previously agreed to by the originator," or the message "resulted
from the actions of a person" who was able to send the message because
of its relationship with the originator.222 These additional provisions are
derived from the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Trans-

fers, which in turn was drawn in substantial measure from the attribution
procedures of U.C.C. Article 4A governing funds transfers.223 This type
of provision was debated extensively during the drafting of the UETA,
and ultimately not included in that statute in the interest of avoiding the
substantive reform of contract and other bodies of law by importing standards developed in the highly specialized context of high value electronic

funds transfers.224

ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE UNIFORM RULES

In 1996, the WG-EC "was requested to examine the desirability and

feasibility of preparing uniform rules on [digital signatures and CAs]."22
It was agreed that these Uniform Rules should address such issues as: the
legal basis supporting certification processes, including emerging digita
authentication and certification technology; the applicability of the certi
fication process; the allocation of risk and liabilities of users, providers
and third parties using certification techniques; the specific issues of cer
tification through the use of registries; and incorporation by reference
Although the Uniform Rules are substantially focused on a single technology, i.e., digital signatures deployed in a PKI, the Uniform Rules are
supposed to be consistent with the media-neutral approach taken with th
Model Law and are not supposed to favor one authentication technology
at the expense of others. The WG-EC is supposed to limit the scope of
its project in deference to the role of party autonomy in establishing mar
ket-based standards for electronic commerce, although it remains unclear
if this will be achieved.

By 1999, it appeared that the WG-EC might be unable to forge a consensus with regard to uniform rules to govern the use of electronic signatures.226 The work of the WG-EC was faulted for excessive emphasis
on digital signatures, and not sufficiently recognizing the business need for
222. Model Law, supra note 210, art. 13.

223. Id. pt. II, art. 13, remarks U 83; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit
Transfers, art. 5 (1992), available in <http://www.unctral.org/english/texts/payments/
mlict.htm>; see U.C.C. §§ 4A-201 to -203 (1995).
224. See, e.g., UETA, Reporter's Notes (Proposed Official Draft, Mar. 19, 1999) (regarding

the deletion of former § 107), in <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/uecicta/
eta399.htm>.

225. UNCITAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, Draft Uniform Rules on Electronic Signatures, thirty-fifth session, UN. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.82 (June 26, 1999)
in <http://www.uncitral.org/english/sessions/wg_ex/wp73.htm> [hereinafter Uniform
Rules].
226. Id. introduction ffl[ 6-7.
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flexibility in adopting new authentication
tainty whether any legislation beyond th
essary to promote continued innovation i
standing these reservations, however, th
Uniform Rules was not withdrawn. This
so many national governments around t
preparing legislation to deal with digital

the regulation of certificate authorities. It w

UNCITRAL might help produce more

area.227

In the June 1999 draft of the Uniform
was still quite technology specific, notwit
WG-EC to soften the effect of rules tha
technologies and associate specific legal c
the one hand, the scope section had been
of the Uniform Rules to commercial tran

that they would not override any consumer

hand, the Uniform Rules still distinguis
which is not a technology-specific term
tures, which must meet a higher standard
consistent with digital signature techno
enhanced electronic signatures with speci
CONCLUSION

In 1999, the message that every business needed an iCe-business
egy was ubiquitous. As managers in businesses across the economy
gled to come to terms with the implications of electronic comm
business operations, one issue among many that managers had to
was the enforceability of contracts entered into using new commu
media. Although the current version of the U.C.C. and the comm
of contracts provide clear answers to a limited number of electro
tracting issues, the application of current law to many more iss
duces ambiguous or unfavorable results. While it is unlikely that a
wants to hear his or her attorney say, "That's an interesting que
response to the client's query about the legal effect of some new e
227. The next meeting of the WG-EG was scheduled for September 1999.
228. Uniform Rules, supra note 225, art. 1.
229. Id. art. 2.

230. If an enhanced electronic signatures is used, it will be presumed to meet any legal
requirement of a signature. Id. art. 6, variant A. While the Uniform Rules also provide that

reliance on an enhanced electronic signature can only be determined by evaluating the
context within which that reliance takes place, they also establish a duty on the part of the
signature holder to prevent its misuse. Id. arts. 9, 10; see supra note 32 and accompanying text
(discussing the pros and cons of technology specific electronic signature laws).
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undertaking,231 the current rush to revise contract law through legislation
may produce even more unfavorable results. A considerable body of opinion among lawyers and managers in the United States supports "medianeutral" approaches to the reform of contract law that minimizes the
magnitude of substantive changes in the law. The constituencies that favor
either "technology-specific" or "electronic commerce enabling" legislation
that deliberately changes the substantive rules of contract in order to promote a particular vision of electronic commerce are numerous and powerful, however, and it is unclear that the "media-neutral" approach will
garner the political support it needs to counteract lobbying by specific
industries to achieve more targeted revisions in contract law.

The current struggles in the United States to define the legislative
agenda for electronic contracting law reforms cannot be viewed in isolation
from the actions of other governments in the same arenas. The EU economy now represents a larger single market than the U.S. economy in terms
of population, and while EU utilization rates for new electronic commerce
technologies such as the Internet currently lags behind that of the United
States, this may not be the case indefinitely. The EU currently seems to
be just as divided as the Unites States in its efforts to define a coherent,
feasible legislative agenda in this area, but almost any possible outcome of
the current EU debates is likely to be more regulatory and more protective
of consumers than almost any possible outcome of the current U.S. debates. As a result, the possibility of future trade disputes between the
United States and EU over "non-tariff" barriers to electronic contracting
may arise, just as conflicts now exist between the United States and EU
over the EU' s higher standards for data privacy.
Yet hasty legislation by national governments rushing to avoid losing a
competitive advantage in the global electronic marketplace may not support the development of electronic commerce at all. Poorly thought out
legislation may instead create unnecessary inefficiencies in contracting
practices if governments fail to correctly anticipate future developments
in electronic commerce. Given the difficulty that entrepreneurs have in
correctly anticipating future developments in this area, it seems almost
inevitable that technology-specific or highly regulatory approaches by national legislatures will not be successful in predicting the future, either. In
the face of the torrent of innovation taking place in the commercial prac-

231. The American Bar Association Section of Business Law's Cyberspace Law Committee's Electronic Contracting Practices Working Group has a project currently underway
to build a "clause bank" for electronic commerce contract terms. See ABA Cyberspace Law

Committee (visited Oct. 8, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/cyber/ecommerce/
ecommerce.html>. The working group plans to assemble and annotate electronic contracting
clauses on its web site that could be used to update standard form contracts. See ABA Cyberspace Law Committee's Contracting Practices Working Group, Electronic Contracting Practices Resources Page (visited Oct. 8, 1999) <http://www.newlaw.com/site/e-contract.htm>.
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tices through the application of new technologies and the limited resources
available to national legislatures to understand and respond to that innovation, many clients may learn to prefer the "That's an interesting question" response from their attorneys when they learn what the alternatives
are.
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